论文标题
通过匿名信息在社交网络中定位
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了只有有关网络拓扑信息的计划者是否可以根据其网络地位来区分代理商。策划者提出了一个简单的合同菜单，每个位置的合同菜单，以最大程度地提高全部福利，而代理商则在菜单中选择。这种机制不受单个药物的偏差，如果排除了副支付，则尺寸为2、3和4的偏差。但是，如果允许赔偿，则一组代理可能会激励共同偏离最佳合同以利用其他代理。我们确定最佳合同的网络拓扑是与转移兼容的团体激励：无向网络和常规的树木，以及计划者必须为其分配统一数量的网络拓扑：单根和嵌套的邻域定向网络。
This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology can discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a simple menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to maximize total welfare, and agents choose among the menu. This mechanism is immune to deviations by single agents, and to deviations by groups of agents of sizes 2, 3 and 4 if side-payments are ruled out. However, if compensations are allowed, groups of agents may have an incentive to jointly deviate from the optimal contract in order to exploit other agents. We identify network topologies for which the optimal contract is group incentive compatible with transfers: undirected networks and regular oriented trees, and network topologies for which the planner must assign uniform quantities: single root and nested neighborhoods directed networks.
