论文标题
安全投票：对弃权和Sybils的韧性
Safe Voting: Resilience to Abstention and Sybils
论文作者
论文摘要
当所有符合条件的选民投票，只有他们时，投票规则可能会执行社会的意愿。但是，当出现Sybil（假或重复）票时，当只有诚实（非Sybil）选民积极参与时，他们可能不会这样做。由于不幸的是，有时候就是这样，我们的目的是在Sybils和选民弃权面前解决社会选择。为此，我们建立在现实感知的社会选择的框架之上：我们将现状成为一种存在的杰出替代方案，并研究了执行投票规则的状态，这些规则增加了虚拟投票以支持现状。我们表征了安全性和livesice（分别为主动诚实的选民维持/更改现状的能力）之间的权衡，并表明实行投票规则的状态通常是最佳的。我们评论我们的方法的适用性，并分析数字社区的治理。
Voting rules may implement the will of the society when all eligible voters vote, and only them. However, they may fail to do so when sybil (fake or duplicate) votes are present and when only some honest (non sybil) voters actively participate. As, unfortunately, sometimes this is the case, our aim here is to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we build upon the framework of Reality-aware Social Choice: we assume the status-quo as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Status-Quo Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We characterize the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in several domains, and show that the Status-Quo Enforcing voting rules are often optimal. We comment on the applicability of our methods and analyses to the governance of digital communities.
