论文标题
Cycledger:通过碎片的分布式分类帐的可扩展和安全的并行协议
CycLedger: A Scalable and Secure Parallel Protocol for Distributed Ledger via Sharding
论文作者
论文摘要
传统的公共分布式分类帐无法很好地扩展并有效地工作。碎片被认为是解决这个问题的一种有希望的方法。通过将所有节点划分为小型委员会并让它们并行工作,我们可以大大降低通信和计算的量,减少每个节点存储的开销,并增强分布式分类帐的吞吐量。现有的基于碎片的协议仍然存在一些严重的缺点。首先是所有非故障节点都必须彼此良好,这需要网络中有大量的通信渠道。此外,在每个委员会领导人的诚实案件中,以前的协议在效率方面遭受了巨大损失。同时,没有向节点积极参与该协议的明确激励措施。 我们提出了CycleDger,这是一种可扩展且安全的并行协议,用于通过碎片分布式分类帐。我们的协议为每个委员会选择了一个领导者和部分委员会,他们负责维持碎片内共识并与其他委员会进行沟通,以减少所有节点上沟通,计算和存储的复杂性。我们在委员会和恢复程序之间介绍了一种新颖的半承诺计划,即使委员会领导人是恶意的,也可以防止该系统崩溃。为了增加网络的激励措施,我们使用声誉的概念,该概念可以衡量每个节点的可信度计算能力。随着声誉较高的节点获得更多的奖励,对具有强大计算能力的节点诚实工作以获得声誉。通过这种方式,我们为基于碎片的分布式分类帐建立可扩展性,安全性和动机的新途径。
Traditional public distributed ledgers have not been able to scale-out well and work efficiently. Sharding is deemed as a promising way to solve this problem. By partitioning all nodes into small committees and letting them work in parallel, we can significantly lower the amount of communication and computation, reduce the overhead on each node's storage, as well as enhance the throughput of the distributed ledger. Existing sharding-based protocols still suffer from several serious drawbacks. The first thing is that all non-faulty nodes must connect well with each other, which demands a huge number of communication channels in the network. Moreover, previous protocols have faced great loss in efficiency in the case where the honesty of each committee's leader is in question. At the same time, no explicit incentive is provided for nodes to actively participate in the protocol. We present CycLedger, a scalable and secure parallel protocol for distributed ledger via sharding. Our protocol selects a leader and a partial set for each committee, who are in charge of maintaining intra-shard consensus and communicating with other committees, to reduce the amortized complexity of communication, computation, and storage on all nodes. We introduce a novel semi-commitment scheme between committees and a recovery procedure to prevent the system from crashing even when leaders of committees are malicious. To add incentive for the network, we use the concept of reputation, which measures each node's trusty computing power. As nodes with a higher reputation receive more rewards, there is an encouragement for nodes with strong computing ability to work honestly to gain reputation. In this way, we strike out a new path to establish scalability, security, and incentive for the sharding-based distributed ledger.