论文标题
在快速相关攻击的量子概括下对Y00协议的分析：迈向信息理论安全
Analysis of Y00 Protocol under Quantum Generalization of a Fast Correlation Attack: Toward Information-Theoretic Security
论文作者
论文摘要
在我们以前的工作中，证明了攻击者无法将正确的密钥固定在启动Y00协议的情况下，概率是在无限的长期已知plaintext攻击和对攻击者量子内存上的最佳量子测量。但是，有几个假设是，Y00系统利用线性反馈移位寄存器作为伪随机数发电机，并且通过对Y00系统的不规则映射来禁用快速的相关攻击。这项研究概括了这种攻击以消除先前工作的假设。这项研究的安全分析的框架重申了过去的两个众所周知的结果：（1）当系统设计不好时，Y00系统将被隐置； （2）当系统设计良好时，系统可能会在理论上确保信息安全，尽管攻击者对正确键的信心会随着时间的推移而增加，但是键恢复的成功概率在有限的时间内没有达到统一性； （3）随着时间的流逝，共享钥匙的违规时间越来越受到威胁。因此，本文提供了Y00协议的键反应程序。此类安全分析不仅在关键刷新中很重要，而且在最初的关键协议情况下也很重要。
In our previous work, it was demonstrated that the attacker could not pin-down the correct keys to start the Y00 protocol with a probability of one under the assistance of unlimitedly long known-plaintext attacks and optimal quantum measurements on the attacker's quantum memory. However, there were several assumptions that the Y00 system utilized linear-feedback shift registers as pseudo-random-number generators, and a fast correlation attack was disabled by irregular mapping on the Y00 systems. This study generalizes such an attack to remove the assumptions of the previous work. The framework of the security analyses of this study reiterates two well-known results from the past: (1) Y00 systems would be cryptanalyzed when the system is not designed well; (2) the system is possibly information-theoretically secure when the system is designed well, although the attacker's confidence in the correct key increases over time but the success probability of key recovery does not reach unity in finite time; (3) the breach time of the shared keys is increasingly threatened with time. Hence, a key-refreshment procedure for the Y00 protocol is provided herein. Such security analyses are important not only in key refreshment but also in initial key agreement situations.
