论文标题
全付拍卖作为贸易战和军事吞并的模型
All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation
论文作者
论文摘要
我们探讨了全付拍卖的应用，以建模贸易战争和领土吞并。具体而言，在模型中，我们考虑预期的资源，生产和激进（军事/关税）是公共信息，但实际资源水平是私人知识。我们考虑在此类竞争结束时的资源转移，该竞争剥夺了弱国家的原始资源的一部分。特别是，在不同情况下，我们为两个国家冲突的准平衡策略提供了准平衡策略。这项工作与正在进行的美国 - 中国贸易战以及最近俄罗斯对克里米亚以及历史和未来冲突有关。
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.
