论文标题

Magneto:指纹通过无意的磁排放驱动USB闪存驱动器

MAGNETO: Fingerprinting USB Flash Drives via Unintentional Magnetic Emissions

论文作者

Ibrahim, Omar Adel, Sciancalepore, Savio, Oligeri, Gabriele, Di Pietro, Roberto

论文摘要

如今,通用串行总线(USB)闪存驱动器是传输文件最方便,最扩散的方法之一,尤其是在没有互联网连接的情况下。但是,USB闪存驱动器也是用于获得未经授权访问主机设备的最常见攻击向量之一。例如,可以替换USB驱动器,以便在连接USB键时,它将安装密码窃取工具,根机软件和其他破坏恶意软件。这样,攻击者可以通过USB连接的设备窃取敏感信息,并将任何类型的恶意软件注入主机。 为了挫败上述升级威胁,我们提出了一种有效的,非交互式和隐私保护框架的Magneto,以验证USB闪存驱动器的真实性,植根于对其意外磁排放的分析。我们表明,在特定主机上启动操作期间辐射的磁排放对于每个设备都是唯一的,并且足以根据使用的设备的不同,可以独特地指纹品牌和USB闪存驱动器或特定USB设备的型号。我们对59种不同USB闪存驱动器的调查 - 属于17个品牌,包括2019年中期在亚马逊上购买的顶级品牌 - 揭示了最低分类精度在品牌和模型的识别中,伴随着可忽略不计的时间和计算时间和计算额外的头顶。 Magneto还可以识别特定的USB闪存驱动器,最小分类精度为91.2%。总体而言,Magneto证明,无意识的磁排放可以被视为指纹读取仅USB闪存驱动器的可行和可靠手段。最后,还讨论了该领域的未来研究方向。

Universal Serial Bus (USB) Flash Drives are nowadays one of the most convenient and diffused means to transfer files, especially when no Internet connection is available. However, USB flash drives are also one of the most common attack vectors used to gain unauthorized access to host devices. For instance, it is possible to replace a USB drive so that when the USB key is connected, it would install passwords stealing tools, root-kit software, and other disrupting malware. In such a way, an attacker can steal sensitive information via the USB-connected devices, as well as inject any kind of malicious software into the host. To thwart the above-cited raising threats, we propose MAGNETO, an efficient, non-interactive, and privacy-preserving framework to verify the authenticity of a USB flash drive, rooted in the analysis of its unintentional magnetic emissions. We show that the magnetic emissions radiated during boot operations on a specific host are unique for each device, and sufficient to uniquely fingerprint both the brand and the model of the USB flash drive, or the specific USB device, depending on the used equipment. Our investigation on 59 different USB flash drives---belonging to 17 brands, including the top brands purchased on Amazon in mid-2019---, reveals a minimum classification accuracy of 98.2% in the identification of both brand and model, accompanied by a negligible time and computational overhead. MAGNETO can also identify the specific USB Flash drive, with a minimum classification accuracy of 91.2%. Overall, MAGNETO proves that unintentional magnetic emissions can be considered as a viable and reliable means to fingerprint read-only USB flash drives. Finally, future research directions in this domain are also discussed.

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