学术文献库

Targeted immunization or attacks of large-scale networks has attracted significant attention by the scientific community. However, in real-world scenarios, knowledge and observations of the network may be limited thereby precluding a full assessment of the optimal nodes to immunize (or remove) in order to avoid epidemic spreading such as that of current COVID-19 epidemic. Here, we study a novel immunization strategy where only $n$ nodes are observed at a time and the most central between these $n$ nodes is immunized (or attacked). This process is continued repeatedly until $1-p$ fraction of nodes are immunized (or attacked). We develop an analytical framework for this approach and determine the critical percolation threshold $p_c$ and the size of the giant component $P_{\infty}$ for networks with arbitrary degree distributions $P(k)$. In the limit of $n\to\infty$ we recover prior work on targeted attack, whereas for $n=1$ we recover the known case of random failure. Between these two extremes, we observe that as $n$ increases, $p_c$ increases quickly towards its optimal value under targeted immunization (attack) with complete information. In particular, we find a new scaling relationship between $|p_c(\infty)-p_c(n)|$ and $n$ as $|p_c(\infty)-p_c(n)|\sim n^{-1}\exp(-αn)$. For Scale-free (SF) networks, where $P(k)\sim k^{-γ}, 2<γ<3$, we find that $p_c$ has a transition from zero to non-zero when $n$ increases from $n=1$ to order of $\log N$ ($N$ is the size of network). Thus, for SF networks, knowledge of order of $\log N$ nodes and immunizing them can reduce dramatically an epidemics.