论文标题
政策干预的损失规避和福利排名
Loss aversion and the welfare ranking of policy interventions
论文作者
论文摘要
本文制定了理论标准和计量经济学方法,以在个人避免损失时对福利进行政策干预。我们针对“损失厌恶敏感的优势”的新标准定义了政策引起的收益和损失的分布的弱序列。它适用于一类福利功能,这些福利功能对个人偏好进行了对结果变化的不折衷和规避损失的态度。我们还开发了新的统计方法,以使用非参数插件估算值来测试实践中对损失厌恶敏感的优势;这些允许通过特殊的重采样程序进行推断。由于对政策引起的收益和损失的分配分配可能需要有牢固的假设,因此我们将比较标准,测试统计数据和重新采样程序扩展到部分确定的案例。我们通过简单的经验应用来说明我们的方法,以比较美国替代收入支持计划的福利比较。
This paper develops theoretical criteria and econometric methods to rank policy interventions in terms of welfare when individuals are loss-averse. Our new criterion for "loss aversion-sensitive dominance" defines a weak partial ordering of the distributions of policy-induced gains and losses. It applies to the class of welfare functions which model individual preferences with non-decreasing and loss-averse attitudes towards changes in outcomes. We also develop new statistical methods to test loss aversion-sensitive dominance in practice, using nonparametric plug-in estimates; these allow inference to be conducted through a special resampling procedure. Since point-identification of the distribution of policy-induced gains and losses may require strong assumptions, we extend our comparison criteria, test statistics, and resampling procedures to the partially-identified case. We illustrate our methods with a simple empirical application to the welfare comparison of alternative income support programs in the US.