论文标题
动态一致的客观和主观合理性
Dynamically Consistent Objective and Subjective Rationality
论文作者
论文摘要
一群专家，例如气候科学家，是在两个政策中选择$ f $和$ g $。考虑以下决策规则。如果所有专家都同意$ f $的预期效用高于$ g $的预期效用，则适用了一致性规则，并选择了$ f $。否则，将实施预防原则，并选择最低的预期公用事业的政策。 当添加不确定性的部分分辨率时，该决策规则可能会导致时间不一致。我们提供的公理会扩大具有否决权的最初的专家群体，从而导致一系列概率信念，这些信念是“矩形”的最低意义。这使该决策规则动态一致，并作为副产品提供了一种新颖的矩形行为表征。
A group of experts, for instance climate scientists, is to choose among two policies $f$ and $g$. Consider the following decision rule. If all experts agree that the expected utility of $f$ is higher than the expected utility of $g$, the unanimity rule applies, and $f$ is chosen. Otherwise the precautionary principle is implemented and the policy yielding the highest minimal expected utility is chosen. This decision rule may lead to time inconsistencies when an intermediate period of partial resolution of uncertainty is added. We provide axioms that enlarge the initial group of experts with veto power, which leads to a set of probabilistic beliefs that is "rectangular" in a minimal sense. This makes this decision rule dynamically consistent and provides, as a byproduct, a novel behavioral characterization of rectangularity.
