论文标题
稀疏性变形:对深神经网络的能量和潜伏期攻击
Sparsity Turns Adversarial: Energy and Latency Attacks on Deep Neural Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
对抗性攻击通过对DNN输入的人类侵蚀性扰动迫使错误分类的能力暴露了深层神经网络(DNN)的严重脆弱性。我们通过建议旨在降低DNN的计算效率而不是分类精度的攻击来探索对抗攻击领域的新方向。具体而言,我们提出并证明了稀疏性攻击,对对抗性修改了DNN的输入,以减少其内部激活值中的稀疏性(或零值的存在)。在资源受限的系统中,已经提出了广泛的硬件和软件技术,以利用稀疏性来提高DNN效率。拟议的攻击增加了稀疏性DNN实施的执行时间和能源消耗,从而引起了对它们在潜伏期和关键能源应用中部署的关注。 我们提出了一种系统的方法,以通过制定一个目标函数来量化网络的激活稀疏性,并使用迭代梯度散发技术来最大程度地量化此功能,从而生成稀疏性攻击的对抗输入。我们启动了对图像识别DNN的对抗稀疏攻击的白色框和黑盒版本,并证明它们将激活稀疏性降低了1.82倍。我们还评估了攻击对稀疏性DNN加速器的影响,并证明了潜伏期高达1.59倍的降解,还研究了对稀疏性优化的通用处理器的攻击性能。最后,我们评估了诸如激活阈值和输入量化之类的防御技术,并证明了拟议的攻击能够承受它们,强调了在对抗机器学习领域内在这一新方向上进一步努力的需求。
Adversarial attacks have exposed serious vulnerabilities in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) through their ability to force misclassifications through human-imperceptible perturbations to DNN inputs. We explore a new direction in the field of adversarial attacks by suggesting attacks that aim to degrade the computational efficiency of DNNs rather than their classification accuracy. Specifically, we propose and demonstrate sparsity attacks, which adversarial modify a DNN's inputs so as to reduce sparsity (or the presence of zero values) in its internal activation values. In resource-constrained systems, a wide range of hardware and software techniques have been proposed that exploit sparsity to improve DNN efficiency. The proposed attack increases the execution time and energy consumption of sparsity-optimized DNN implementations, raising concern over their deployment in latency and energy-critical applications. We propose a systematic methodology to generate adversarial inputs for sparsity attacks by formulating an objective function that quantifies the network's activation sparsity, and minimizing this function using iterative gradient-descent techniques. We launch both white-box and black-box versions of adversarial sparsity attacks on image recognition DNNs and demonstrate that they decrease activation sparsity by up to 1.82x. We also evaluate the impact of the attack on a sparsity-optimized DNN accelerator and demonstrate degradations up to 1.59x in latency, and also study the performance of the attack on a sparsity-optimized general-purpose processor. Finally, we evaluate defense techniques such as activation thresholding and input quantization and demonstrate that the proposed attack is able to withstand them, highlighting the need for further efforts in this new direction within the field of adversarial machine learning.