论文标题
情人眼中的预测:瓦特州长的积极推理说明
Predictions in the eye of the beholder: an active inference account of Watt governors
论文作者
论文摘要
主动推论引入了一种理论,描述了通过最小化(和预期)自由能的最小化行动感知环,或者在简化的假设(加权)预测误差下。最近,已经提出了主动推断,作为认知科学中新的统一框架的一部分:预测处理。预测处理通常与思想的传统计算理论有关,强烈依赖于以生成模型的形式提出的内部表示,以解释生活和认知系统的不同功能。在这项工作中,我们介绍了瓦特离心总督的积极推断表述,该系统通常被描绘成经典的“反陈述”认知隐喻。我们为调速器确定蒸汽引擎的生成模型,并得出一组描述“感知”和“动作”过程的方程式,作为预测误差最小化的一种形式。在此过程中,我们首先挑战生成模型作为认知系统的明确内部表示的思想,这表明此类模型仅作为观察者的隐式描述。其次,我们将当前的预测处理提案视为一种认知理论,重点是其一些潜在的缺点,尤其是在这样的想法上,即几乎任何系统都在预测错误最小化方面接受描述,这表明该理论可能为认知系统提供有限的解释力。最后,作为一线希望,我们强调了该框架可以作为数学工具扮演的工具作用,以建模用贝叶斯(主动)推论来解释的认知体系结构。
Active inference introduces a theory describing action-perception loops via the minimisation of variational (and expected) free energy or, under simplifying assumptions, (weighted) prediction error. Recently, active inference has been proposed as part of a new and unifying framework in the cognitive sciences: predictive processing. Predictive processing is often associated with traditional computational theories of the mind, strongly relying on internal representations presented in the form of generative models thought to explain different functions of living and cognitive systems. In this work, we introduce an active inference formulation of the Watt centrifugal governor, a system often portrayed as the canonical "anti-representational" metaphor for cognition. We identify a generative model of a steam engine for the governor, and derive a set of equations describing "perception" and "action" processes as a form of prediction error minimisation. In doing so, we firstly challenge the idea of generative models as explicit internal representations for cognitive systems, suggesting that such models serve only as implicit descriptions for an observer. Secondly, we consider current proposals of predictive processing as a theory of cognition, focusing on some of its potential shortcomings and in particular on the idea that virtually any system admits a description in terms of prediction error minimisation, suggesting that this theory may offer limited explanatory power for cognitive systems. Finally, as a silver lining we emphasise the instrumental role this framework can nonetheless play as a mathematical tool for modelling cognitive architectures interpreted in terms of Bayesian (active) inference.