论文标题
使用恶意设备的子集安全量子密钥分布
Secure quantum key distribution with a subset of malicious devices
论文作者
论文摘要
对量子密钥分布（QKD）硬件的恶意操纵是对其安全性的严重威胁，因为通常，最终用户和QKD制造商都无法在实践中验证其QKD系统每个组件的完整性。重新建立QKD安全性的一种可能方法是使用冗余数量的设备。在此想法之后，我们引入了有效的分布式QKD后处理协议，并在可能恶意设备的各种损坏模型中证明了其安全性。我们发现，与最保守和协作损坏的设备的最保守模型相比，自然假设可显着提高秘密关键速度，并且QKD设置更为简单。此外，我们表明，在大多数实际情况下，由此产生的有限尺寸秘密关键率与假设可信赖的设备的标准方案相似。
The malicious manipulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware is a serious threat to its security, as, typically, neither end users nor QKD manufacturers can validate the integrity of every component of their QKD system in practice. One possible approach to re-establish the security of QKD is to use a redundant number of devices. Following this idea, we introduce an efficient distributed QKD post-processing protocol and prove its security in a variety of corruption models of the possibly malicious devices. We find that, compared to the most conservative model of active and collaborative corrupted devices, natural assumptions lead to a significant enhancement of the secret key rate and considerably simpler QKD setups. Furthermore, we show that, for most practical situations, the resulting finite-size secret key rate is similar to that of the standard scenario assuming trusted devices.
