论文标题
带有部分可验证信息的项目选择
Project selection with partially verifiable information
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了不对称信息的主要代理项目选择问题。有$ n $项目，本金必须精确选择其中之一。每个项目为本金提供一些利润，并向代理商提供一些收益，而这些利润和回报是代理商的私人信息。我们考虑了校长为两个不同目标找到最佳机制的问题：最大化预期利润并最大化选择最有利可图的项目的可能性。重要的是，我们假定部分验证性，因此代理商不能报告项目比实际上更有利润。在这个无关紧要的约束下，我们表征了可实施机制的集合。使用此表征，我们发现在两个项目的情况下，两个目标下的最佳机制采用了简单的截止机制的形式。最佳机制的简单结构还使我们能够找到支持众所周知的盟友原理的证据，该盟友说，校长将更多的权力委派给了具有他们偏好的代理商。
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent and these profits and payoffs are the agent's private information. We consider the principal's problem of finding an optimal mechanism for two different objectives: maximizing expected profit and maximizing the probability of choosing the most profitable project. Importantly, we assume partial verifiability so that the agent cannot report a project to be more profitable to the principal than it actually is. Under this no-overselling constraint, we characterize the set of implementable mechanisms. Using this characterization, we find that in the case of two projects, the optimal mechanism under both objectives takes the form of a simple cutoff mechanism. The simple structure of the optimal mechanism also allows us to find evidence in support of the well-known ally-principle which says that principal delegates more authority to an agent who shares their preferences.
