论文标题

用于沟通效率的联合联合学习的联合拍卖式形成框架在UAV支持的车辆互联网中

Joint Auction-Coalition Formation Framework for Communication-Efficient Federated Learning in UAV-Enabled Internet of Vehicles

论文作者

Ng, Jer Shyuan, Lim, Wei Yang Bryan, Dai, Hong-Ning, Xiong, Zehui, Huang, Jianqiang, Niyato, Dusit, Hua, Xian-Sheng, Leung, Cyril, Miao, Chunyan

论文摘要

由于车辆互联网(IOV)组件的先进功能,例如车辆,路边单元(RSUS)和智能设备以及越来越多的数据产生的数据,联合学习(FL)成为一种有前途的工具,因为它可以在IOV中实现隐私的机器学习。但是,FL的性能受到通信链接和缺失节点的失败,尤其是在需要连续交换模型参数时。因此,我们建议使用无人机(UAV)作为无线继电器,以促进IOV组件与FL服务器之间的通信,从而提高FL的准确性。但是,单个无人机可能没有足够的资源来为FL流程的所有迭代提供服务。在本文中,我们提出了一个联合拍卖式形成框架,以解决无人机联盟对IOV组件组的分配。具体而言,制定了联盟组合游戏,以最大程度地提高无人机的个人利润之和。提出了联合拍卖式化算法以实现无人机联盟的稳定分区,在该分区中,应用拍卖方案应用于解决无人机联盟的分配。拍卖方案旨在考虑IOV组件比异构无人机的偏好。仿真结果表明,由于无人机的利润最大化行为,所有无人机加入一个联盟的大联盟并不总是稳定。此外,我们表明,随着无人机的合作成本增加,无人机更喜欢独立支持IOV组件,而不是组建任何联盟。

Due to the advanced capabilities of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) components such as vehicles, Roadside Units (RSUs) and smart devices as well as the increasing amount of data generated, Federated Learning (FL) becomes a promising tool given that it enables privacy-preserving machine learning that can be implemented in the IoV. However, the performance of the FL suffers from the failure of communication links and missing nodes, especially when continuous exchanges of model parameters are required. Therefore, we propose the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as wireless relays to facilitate the communications between the IoV components and the FL server and thus improving the accuracy of the FL. However, a single UAV may not have sufficient resources to provide services for all iterations of the FL process. In this paper, we present a joint auction-coalition formation framework to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions to groups of IoV components. Specifically, the coalition formation game is formulated to maximize the sum of individual profits of the UAVs. The joint auction-coalition formation algorithm is proposed to achieve a stable partition of UAV coalitions in which an auction scheme is applied to solve the allocation of UAV coalitions. The auction scheme is designed to take into account the preferences of IoV components over heterogeneous UAVs. The simulation results show that the grand coalition, where all UAVs join a single coalition, is not always stable due to the profit-maximizing behavior of the UAVs. In addition, we show that as the cooperation cost of the UAVs increases, the UAVs prefer to support the IoV components independently and not to form any coalition.

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