论文标题
重新审视战略网络战理论，达到决定性战略结果
Revisiting Strategic Cyberwar Theory Reaching Decisive Strategic Outcome
论文作者
论文摘要
每种策略都有一个基础，这是一种总体方式，可以解释为什么事情是我们看到它们的方式以及如何成功实现我们的目标的方式。因此，策略是理论的，因为理论为预测结果提供了一个智力框架，从而导致战略实现的最终目标。本文将介绍一种理论，即战略Cyberwar理论，该理论指出，战略网络战的实用性与目标国家制度不稳定的可能性有关。在理想的情况下，网络攻击正在系统地攻击目标的对手机构，触发嵌入在机构较弱国家的国家的休眠熵。这将导致对外交政策和意图的提交。当前的战略网络战理论的替代方案是通过发生剥削机会的网络攻击，非系统地攻击对手，这可能会降低信息基础架构的一部分，但它将无法实现任何战略目标。如果一个对抗性社会不受网络冲突的影响，那么冲突本身并没有达到决定性的结果，而仅导致TAT游戏或僵局的山雀。在战略性的Cyberwar理论中，该概念是网络攻击敌对国家的制度框架的核心，以追求不稳定。
Each strategy has a foundation, an overarching way of explaining why things are the way we see them and how to successfully reach our goals. Therefore, strategy is theory based because theory provides an intellectual framework for predicting outcomes leading to the end goal the strategy pursues. This article will present a theory, strategic cyberwar theory, that states that the utility of strategic cyberwar is tied to the likelihood of institutional instability in the targeted nation. In an ideal scenario, the cyber attacks are systematically attacking the targeted adversary institutions triggering the dormant entropy embedded in a nation with weak institutions. This will lead to submission to foreign policy and intent. The current alternative to strategic cyberwar theory is to unsystematically attack the adversary with cyber attacks where exploitation opportunities occur, which is likely to degrade parts of the information infrastructure, but it will not reach any strategic goals. If an adversarial society is unaffected by a cyber conflict, the conflict itself has not reached a decisive outcome, and results only in tit for tat game or stalemate. In strategic cyberwar theory1, the concept is to cyber attack the core of the institutional framework of the adversarial nation in pursuit of destabilization.
