论文标题
在连续运输游戏中，无政府状态和稳定的价格紧密界限
Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy and Stability in Sequential Transportation Games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们分析了Fotakis，Gourvès和Monnot在2017年首次引入的运输游戏，在那里，玩家希望尽快将玩家运送到共同的目的地，并为了实现这一目标，他们必须选择其中一辆可用的公共汽车。我们介绍了该游戏的顺序版本，并考虑了稳定性的顺序价格以及在公制和非金属实例中无政府状态的顺序价格，考虑了三个社会成本功能：所有公共汽车的总行进距离，公共汽车旅行的最大距离，以及所有参与者所旅行的距离的总和（我们介绍了我们介绍的新社交成本功能）。最后，我们分析了同时运输游戏中这种新功能的稳定价格和无政府状态的价格。
In this paper, we analyze a transportation game first introduced by Fotakis, Gourvès, and Monnot in 2017, where players want to be transported to a common destination as quickly as possible and, in order to achieve this goal, they have to choose one of the available buses. We introduce a sequential version of this game and provide bounds for the Sequential Price of Stability and the Sequential Price of Anarchy in both metric and non-metric instances, considering three social cost functions: the total traveled distance by all buses, the maximum distance traveled by a bus, and the sum of the distances traveled by all players (a new social cost function that we introduce). Finally, we analyze the Price of Stability and the Price of Anarchy for this new function in simultaneous transportation games.
