论文标题
付款渠道网络中本地路由的结构攻击
Structural Attacks on Local Routing in Payment Channel Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
支付通道网络（PCN）启用可扩展区块链交易，而无需从根本上更改基础分布式分类帐算法。但是，通过PCN中的多个渠道进行付款需要锁定抵押品的可能长时间。对手可以滥用这种机制来进行拒绝服务攻击。以前的工作集中在源路由上，随着这些网络的增长，这不太可能仍然是可行的路由方法。 在这项工作中，我们检查了基于本地知识的路由算法的PCN中攻击的有效性，其中折衷的中间节点可以延迟或删除交易以创建拒绝服务。我们专注于Speedymurmurs作为此类协议的代表。我们确定两个攻击者节点选择策略；一个基于路由树中的位置，另一个基于中心性。我们的模拟驱动研究表明，尽管它们都是有效的，但基于中心性的攻击方法几乎是最佳的有效性。我们还表明，这些攻击在较少集中的网络中无效，并讨论了PCN参与者通过他们彼此建立的付款渠道创建较少集中式拓扑的激励措施。
Payment channel networks (PCN) enable scalable blockchain transactions without fundamentally changing the underlying distributed ledger algorithm. However, routing a payment via multiple channels in a PCN requires locking collateral for potentially long periods of time. Adversaries can abuse this mechanism to conduct denial-of-service attacks. Previous work focused on source routing, which is unlikely to remain a viable routing approach as these networks grow. In this work, we examine the effectiveness of attacks in PCNs that use routing algorithms based on local knowledge, where compromised intermediate nodes can delay or drop transactions to create denial-of-service. We focus on SpeedyMurmurs as a representative of such protocols. We identify two attacker node selection strategies; one based on the position in the routing tree, and the other on betweenness centrality. Our simulation-driven study shows that while they are both effective, the centrality-based attack approaches near-optimal effectiveness. We also show that the attacks are ineffective in less centralized networks and discuss incentives for the participants in PCNs to create less centralized topologies through the payment channels they establish among themselves.
