论文标题
收入单调性下的竞标者
Revenue Monotonicity Under Misspecified Bidders
论文作者
论文摘要
我们在为每个投标人指定分布的模型中调查了拍卖机制的收入保证，但只有某些分布是正确的。拍卖人未知的竞标子集的分布的子集（此后为“绿色竞标者”）是未知的。我们要解决的问题是，拍卖师是否可以运行一种机制，该机制只能通过在绿色竞标者上运行最佳机制来获得至少能获得尽可能多的收入。对于单参数可行性环境，我们发现答案取决于可行性约束。对于矩阵环境，使用所有指定的分布（包括不正确的分布）运行最佳机制，保证了与运行绿色竞标者的最佳机制相同的预期收入。对于任何不是Matroid的可行性约束，存在一种设置指定分布和真实分布的方法，从而使相反的结论得出。
We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified (henceforth, the "green bidders") is unknown to the auctioneer. The question we address is whether the auctioneer can run a mechanism that is guaranteed to obtain at least as much revenue, in expectation, as would be obtained by running an optimal mechanism on the green bidders only. For single-parameter feasibility environments, we find that the answer depends on the feasibility constraint. For matroid environments, running the optimal mechanism using all the specified distributions (including the incorrect ones) guarantees at least as much revenue in expectation as running the optimal mechanism on the green bidders. For any feasibility constraint that is not a matroid, there exists a way of setting the specified distributions and the true distributions such that the opposite conclusion holds.
