论文标题
通用普通代理模型中的真实平衡
Truthful Equilibria in Generalized Common Agency Models
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我在普通代理模型中讨论了真实的平衡。具体而言，我提供了一般条件，在这些条件下，真实的平衡是合理的，易于计算和高效的条件。这些条件在文献中推广了类似的结果，并允许在新颖的经济应用中使用真实的平衡。此外，我提供了两个这样的应用程序。第一个应用程序是市场游戏，其中多个卖家向单个买家出售统一的商品。第二个应用程序是游说模型，其中游说之间有外部性。最后一个例子表明，本金之间的外部性不一定阻止有效的平衡。在这方面，本文提供了一系列条件，在这些条件下，具有外部性的普通代理模型中的真实均衡是有效的。
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in the literature and allow the use of truthful equilibria in novel economic applications. Moreover, I provide two such applications. The first application is a market game in which multiple sellers sell a uniform good to a single buyer. The second application is a lobbying model in which there are externalities in contributions between lobbies. This last example indicates that externalities between principals do not necessarily prevent efficient equilibria. In this regard, this paper provides a set of conditions, under which, truthful equilibria in common agency models with externalities are efficient.
