论文标题
交易定价以最大化碎片链分类帐中的吞吐量
Transaction Pricing for Maximizing Throughput in a Sharded Blockchain Ledger
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提出了一种定价机制，该机制使代理商的激励措施保持一致，他们在分散分类帐上交换资源，以最大化交易吞吐量。将区块链分类帐细化为碎片，有望大大增加交易吞吐量，而安全性损失最小。但是，交易的组织和类型也会影响分类帐的效率，在可能的情况下通过单个碎片交易的钱包代理提高了分类帐的效率，同时在可用的碎片上均匀地分配其交易。由于没有中央权力来执行这些属性，因此实现它们的唯一手段是设计该系统，以使代理商的利益以使整体吞吐量受益。我们表明，我们提出的定价政策通过诱导代理的潜在游戏来实现这一目标，而潜在功能直接与分类帐吞吐量有关。模拟表明，该政策在各种条件下导致近乎最佳的吞吐量。
In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to greatly increase transaction throughput with minimal loss of security. However, the organization and type of the transactions also affects the ledger's efficiency, which is increased by wallet agents transacting in a single shard whenever possible while collectively distributing their transactions uniformly across the available shards. Since there is no central authority to enforce these properties, the only means of achieving them is to design the system such that it is in agents' interest to act in a way that benefits overall throughput. We show that our proposed pricing policy does exactly this by inducing a potential game for the agents, where the potential function relates directly to ledger throughput. Simulations demonstrate that this policy leads to near-optimal throughput under a variety of conditions.
