论文标题
一般网络物理攻击下的电网状态估计
Power Grid State Estimation under General Cyber-Physical Attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
有效防御电网中的网络物理攻击需要在攻击区域内进行准确的损害评估的能力。尽管已经提出了一些解决方案来恢复受攻击区域内的相角和链接状态（即断路器状态），但现有的解决方案提出了限制性假设，即攻击后电网保持连接。为了填补这一空白，我们研究了在一般的网络物理攻击下恢复相位角度和链路状态的问题，该攻击可能将网格分为岛屿。为此，我们（i）表明，如果知道攻击区域中的攻击后功率注射后，现有的解决方案和恢复条件仍然存在，并且（ii）提出了一种基于线性编程的算法，即使未知后攻击力注射后，也可以在某些条件下完美恢复链接状态，即使未知。我们基于波兰功率电网的数值评估表明，一旦已知相位角度，提出的算法在定位失败的链接方面非常准确。
Effective defense against cyber-physical attacks in power grid requires the capability of accurate damage assessment within the attacked area. While some solutions have been proposed to recover the phase angles and the link status (i.e., breaker status) within the attacked area, existing solutions made the limiting assumption that the grid stays connected after the attack. To fill this gap, we study the problem of recovering the phase angles and the link status under a general cyber-physical attack that may partition the grid into islands. To this end, we (i) show that the existing solutions and recovery conditions still hold if the post-attack power injections in the attacked area are known, and (ii) propose a linear programming-based algorithm that can perfectly recover the link status under certain conditions even if the post-attack power injections are unknown. Our numerical evaluations based on the Polish power grid demonstrate that the proposed algorithm is highly accurate in localizing failed links once the phase angles are known.
