论文标题
通过说服计算预测市场的平衡
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了预测市场中最基本的特殊案例中的平衡计算，有两个参与者和三个交易机会。为此，我们与Kong and Schoenebeck（2018）提出的承诺相等的预测市场平衡与更简单的信号游戏。然后，我们通过为其他参数制度提供计算有效算法来扩展其结果。我们的方法利用了预测市场与贝叶斯说服力之间的新联系，这也揭示了有趣的概念见解。
We study the computation of equilibria in prediction markets in perhaps the most fundamental special case with two players and three trading opportunities. To do so, we show equivalence of prediction market equilibria with those of a simpler signaling game with commitment introduced by Kong and Schoenebeck (2018). We then extend their results by giving computationally efficient algorithms for additional parameter regimes. Our approach leverages a new connection between prediction markets and Bayesian persuasion, which also reveals interesting conceptual insights.
