论文标题
强大的贝叶斯主义和可能性
Robust Bayesianism and Likelihoodism
论文作者
论文摘要
我们捍卫一种新的统计证据理论，我们称之为强大的贝叶斯主义（RB）。 We prove that, under widely accepted assumptions, RB entails the law of likelihood [Royall, 1997], the likelihood principle [Berger and Wolpert, 1988], and a variety of other widely-accepted "statistical principles", e.g., the sufficiency principle [Birnbaum, 1962, 1972] and stopping-rule principle [Berger and Wolpert, 1988].本文的主要技术贡献是将其中一些结果扩展到一个定性框架，在这种框架中，实验者仅在对比较的，非数字的判断中才是合理的“ A给定B比C给定D的可能性更可能更有可能。”
We defend a new theory of statistical evidence, which we call Robust Bayesianism (RB). We prove that, under widely accepted assumptions, RB entails the law of likelihood [Royall, 1997], the likelihood principle [Berger and Wolpert, 1988], and a variety of other widely-accepted "statistical principles", e.g., the sufficiency principle [Birnbaum, 1962, 1972] and stopping-rule principle [Berger and Wolpert, 1988]. The main technical contribution of this paper is to extend some of those results to a qualitative framework in which experimenters are justified only in making comparative, non-numerical judgments of the form "A given B is more likely than C given D."
