论文标题
隔离的出现：从可观察的标记到组特定规范
The emergence of segregation: from observable markers to group specific norms
论文作者
论文摘要
可观察到的社会特征决定了我们在社会中的互动方式，即使在我们的全球化世界中也保持普遍性。尽管一个流行的假设指出，它们可能有助于促进合作，但近年来，他们促进协调的另一种解释已经取得了基础。在这里，我们探索了这个框架，并提出了一个模型，该模型调查了种族标记在协调游戏中的作用。我们考虑固定的标记物来表征使用加固学习来更新其在游戏中的策略的代理。对于广泛的参数，我们观察到集体均衡的出现，其中标记起着各种作用。但是，如果个人太符合者或贪婪，标记将无法塑造社交互动。这些结果扩展并补充了以前的工作，重点是代理模仿，并表明增强学习是解释许多种族标记实例的好候选人。
Observable social traits determine how we interact in society and remain pervasive even in our globalized world. While a popular hypothesis states that they may help promote cooperation, the alternative explanation that they facilitate coordination has gained ground in recent years. Here we explore this framework and present a model that investigates the role of ethnic markers in coordination games. We consider fixed markers characterizing agents that use reinforcement learning to update their strategies in the game. For a wide range of parameters, we observe the emergence of a collective equilibrium in which markers play an assorting role. However, if individuals are too conformists or greedy, markers fail to shape social interactions. These results extend and complement previous work focused on agent imitation and show that reinforcement learning is a good candidate to explain many instances of ethnic markers.
