论文标题
完全安全的消息传输与理性对手
Perfectly Secure Message Transmission against Rational Adversaries
论文作者
论文摘要
安全消息传输（SMT）是一种两方密码协议，发件人可以使用多个渠道将消息牢固可靠地传输给接收器。对手会破坏渠道的子集，并在渠道上进行窃听和篡改攻击。在这项工作中，我们引入了SMT的游戏理论安全模型，在该模型中，对手对协议执行有一些偏好。我们定义了宁愿违反安全要求但不希望检测到篡改的理性“胆小”对手。 首先，我们考虑单个对手攻击协议的基本设置。我们构建完美的SMT协议，以针对除一个渠道以外的所有理性对手损坏的任何理性对手。由于在传统环境中需要少数派腐败，因此我们的结果表明了一种通过游戏理论方法来规避加密不可能结果的方法。 接下来，我们研究了所有不合作的对手可以破坏所有渠道的环境。由于如果一个对手损坏所有渠道或多个对手的合作，我们不能希望对任何安全性进行恶意的损害，那么这种情况可能来自游戏理论模型。我们还研究了存在恶意和理性对手的情况。
Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. An adversary can corrupt a subset of the channels and commit eavesdropping and tampering attacks over the channels. In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic security model for SMT in which adversaries have some preferences for protocol execution. We define rational "timid" adversaries who prefer to violate security requirements but do not prefer the tampering to be detected. First, we consider the basic setting where a single adversary attacks the protocol. We construct perfect SMT protocols against any rational adversary corrupting all but one of the channels. Since minority corruption is required in the traditional setting, our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the cryptographic impossibility results by a game-theoretic approach. Next, we study the setting in which all the channels can be corrupted by multiple adversaries who do not cooperate. Since we cannot hope for any security if a single adversary corrupts all the channels or multiple adversaries cooperate maliciously, the scenario can arise from a game-theoretic model. We also study the scenario in which both malicious and rational adversaries exist.
