论文标题
超级队还是公平的联赛？强大的监管机构的奇偶校验政策不会阻止捕获
Super-teams or fair leagues? Parity policies by powerful regulators don't prevent capture
论文作者
论文摘要
现代社会的大部分内容都是建立在精心策划的机构上，这些机构通过培养有动力的团队，相互对抗并分发随之而来的武器竞赛成果来创造社会商品。但是，即使“做市商”愿意并且能够保持团队之间的奇偶能力，它也可能无法保持水平的竞争环境，因为有些团队在系统中获得了足够的优势来获得对IT的影响并使他们的优势制度化。利用来自四个职业篮球联赛的60,000多场比赛的结果和价值100多年的赛季，我们计算了不断发展的违反传播性违规率（a> b，b> c，但C> a）衡量联盟在团队之间保持平等的能力，并支持创新的高效产生和分配。与随机排列的结果基线相比，我们发现篮球随着时间的流逝而变得越来越少，表明球队的性能有所不同，并反映了做市商可能无法驯服其压倒性球队的可能性。我们的结果表明，丰富的动力是如此有害，以至于它们甚至可以在有动力预防它们的强大管理员的手表下出现。
Much of modern society is founded on orchestrating institutions that produce social goods by fostering motivated teams, pitting them against each other, and distributing the fruits of the arms races that ensue. However, even when the "market maker" is willing and able to maintain parity between teams, it may fail to maintain a level playing field, as some teams acquire enough advantage within the system to gain influence over it and institutionalize their advantage. Using outcomes of over 60,000 games from four professional basketball leagues and more than 100 years' worth of seasons, we compute the evolving rate of transitivity violations (A>B, B>C, but C>A) to measure the ability of leagues to maintain parity between teams, and support the efficient generation and distribution of innovation. Comparing against a baseline of randomly permuted outcomes, we find that basketball has become less competitive over time, suggesting that teams diverge in performance, and reflecting a possible failure of market makers to tame their overpowered teams. Our results suggest that rich-get-richer dynamics are so pernicious that they can even emerge under the watch of a powerful administrator that is motivated to prevent them.
