论文标题
在非合作游戏中寻求全面分布式的NASH均衡
Prescribed-Time Fully Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中,我们研究了一个规定的时间和完全分布的NASH平衡(NE),以寻求连续非合作游戏的问题。通过利用伪射门游戏和基于共识的方案,在固定或切换通信拓扑上呈现了各种分布式的NE搜索算法,以便在规定的时间内达到NE的收敛性。特别是,只要可以根据某些全局信息(例如,通信图的代数连接性)选择静态控制器增益,并在固定的图表中找到了处方的时间分布式寻求算法,以在固定图中开发,以在先前的和用户定义的时间中找到NE,并且可以选择静态控制器的收益,以及Lipschitz和Pseudo-Monotone Constants and Pseudo Gromentant and Monotone Constants与Perecudo Gradient oppersigent oppertient opprotient optiment opprotient optiment opprotigent函数相关的静态控制器。其次,提出了一种规定的时间和完全分布的NE寻求算法来消除全球信息,通过设计异质的动态增长来触发通信拓扑的权重。此外,我们扩展了该算法以适应共同切换拓扑。从理论上讲,这些提出的算法与NE的全局融合在基于时间函数转换方法的规定时间内是严格保证的。最后,提出了数值仿真结果,以验证设计的有效性。
In this paper, we investigate a prescribed-time and fully distributed Nash Equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for continuous-time noncooperative games. By exploiting pseudo-gradient play and consensus-based schemes, various distributed NE seeking algorithms are presented over either fixed or switching communication topologies so that the convergence to the NE is reached in a prescribed time. In particular, a prescribed-time distributed NE seeking algorithm is firstly developed under a fixed graph to find the NE in a prior-given and user-defined time, provided that a static controller gain can be selected based on certain global information such as the algebraic connectivity of the communication graph and both the Lipschitz and monotone constants of the pseudo-gradient associated with players' objective functions. Secondly, a prescribed-time and fully distributed NE seeking algorithm is proposed to remove global information by designing heterogeneous dynamic gains that turn on-line the weights of the communication topology. Further, we extend this algorithm to accommodate jointly switching topologies. It is theoretically proved that the global convergence of those proposed algorithms to the NE is rigorously guaranteed in a prescribed time based on a time function transformation approach. In the last, numerical simulation results are presented to verify the effectiveness of the designs.