论文标题
利用多路径来保护MMWave通信免受随机位置的窃听器
Exploiting Multi-Path for Safeguarding mmWave Communications Against Randomly Located Eavesdroppers
论文作者
论文摘要
最近提出了在毫米波(MMWave)频段中进行的通信,以启用下一代无线系统的每秒数据速率。物理层安全技术已成为一种简单但有效的方法,可以保护这些系统免于窃听攻击。这些技术利用MMWave系统中可用的大型天线阵列在目标接收器上提供阵列增益并降低EavesDropper的信号质量。尽管它们有效,但这些技术中的大多数都是基于发射器和接收器之间的视线通信链接,并且在存在堵塞或非线链接的情况下可能会失败。本文以先前的工作为基础,并将物理层安全性扩展到非视线通信案例和随机位置的窃听器。具体而言,利用MMWave系统中的大尺寸天线阵列和无线通道的固有特性,以诱导具有敏感接收器的锯齿状窃听器的噪声信号。数值结果表明,与基于视线链路的常规阵列和物理层技术相比,所提出的技术提供了更高的保密率。
Communication in the millimeter-wave (mmWave) band has recently been proposed to enable giga-bit-per-second data rates for next generation wireless systems. Physical layer security techniques have emerged as a simple and yet effective way to safeguard these systems against eavesdropping attacks. These techniques make use of the large antenna arrays available in mmWave systems to provide an array gain at the target receiver and degrade the signal quality at the eavesdropper. Despite their effectiveness, majority of these techniques are based on line-of-sight communication links between the transmitter and the receiver, and may fail in the presence of blockages or non-line-of-sight links. This paper builds upon previous work and extends physical layer security to the non-line-of-sight communication case and randomly located eavesdroppers. Specifically, the large dimensional antenna arrays in mmWave systems and the intrinsic characteristics of wireless channel are exploited to induce noiselike signals that jam eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers. Numerical results show that the proposed techniques provide higher secrecy rate when compared to conventional array and physical layer techniques based on line-of-sight links.