论文标题
在网络中揭穿谣言
Debunking Rumors in Networks
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个真实和虚假信息（谣言）在社交网络中的传播。听到消息后，个人可能会相信，不相信它或通过昂贵的验证来揭穿它。每当真相以稳定状态生存时，谣言也是如此。沟通强度本身与相对谣言的流行无关，同质的效果取决于确切的验证过程和平衡验证率。我们的模型强调，与谣言斗争中的成功政策增加了个人验证的激励措施。
We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals' incentives to verify.
