论文标题
如何出售硬信息
How to Sell Hard Information
论文作者
论文摘要
资产的卖方可以选择从中介机构那里购买有关资产价值的硬信息。然后，卖方可以在竞争市场上出售资产之前披露获得的信息。我们研究中介方式如何设计和出售艰苦的信息，以稳健地最大限度地提高她在所有均衡中的收入。即使中介可以使用揭示资产价值的准确测试，但我们表明，强大的收入最大化会导致嘈杂的测试，并以呈指数分数的可能分数连续分析。此外，中介总是向卖方收取向市场披露测试分数的费用，但不一定要进行测试。这使中介机构能够鲁棒地适当地适当资产销售所产生的盈余中，即使测试产生的信息没有提供社会价值。
The seller of an asset has the option to buy hard information about the value of the asset from an intermediary. The seller can then disclose the acquired information before selling the asset in a competitive market. We study how the intermediary designs and sells hard information to robustly maximize her revenue across all equilibria. Even though the intermediary could use an accurate test that reveals the asset's value, we show that robust revenue maximization leads to a noisy test with a continuum of possible scores that are distributed exponentially. In addition, the intermediary always charges the seller for disclosing the test score to the market, but not necessarily for running the test. This enables the intermediary to robustly appropriate a significant share of the surplus resulting from the asset sale even though the information generated by the test provides no social value.
