论文标题
扩散的多单元拍卖，边际公用事业人士减少
Diffusion Multi-unit Auctions with Diminishing Marginal Utility Buyers
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个拍卖设计问题，卖方将多个同质物品出售给一组互联的买家。每个买家只知道她直接与之联系的买家，并且对这些物品的边际公用事业估值降低。卖方最初仅连接到一些可以由卖方直接邀请出售的买家。我们的目标是设计拍卖，以激励他们意识到拍卖的买家，以进一步邀请邻居加入拍卖。这是具有挑战性的，因为买家正在争夺这些物品，默认情况下他们不会互相邀请。因此，需要给散布信息的买家奖励，但是应仔细设计奖励以保证邀请范围和卖方的收入。最近已经针对每个买家最多需要一个单元并证明设计困难的设置提出了解决方案。我们向前迈进，建议为多单元需求环境提出第一次扩散拍卖，以改善社会福利和卖方的收入。
We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items. The seller initially only connects to some buyers who can be directly invited to the sale by the seller. Our goal is to design an auction to incentivize the buyers who are aware of the auction to further invite their neighbors to join the auction. This is challenging because the buyers are competing for the items and they would not invite each other by default. Thus, rewards need to be given to buyers who diffuse information, but the rewards should be carefully designed to guarantee both invitation incentives and the seller's revenue. Solutions have been proposed recently for the settings where each buyer requires at most one unit and demonstrated the difficulties of the design. We move this forward to propose the very first diffusion auction for the multi-unit demand settings to improve both the social welfare and the seller's revenue.
