论文标题
并发随机游戏中的平衡与公平性
Correlated Equilibria and Fairness in Concurrent Stochastic Games
论文作者
论文摘要
游戏理论技术和平衡分析有助于竞争系统的设计和验证。尽管已经对平衡计算的算法复杂性进行了广泛的研究，但更新的游戏理论方法的实施和应用是更新的。 Prism游戏之类的工具支持零和（Epsilon-time-Timal Sub-Perfect）社会福利Nash Equilibria属性的自动验证和合成（Epsilon-timer-Timal-timal-timal sub-perfect-Perfect-Perfect）。但是，随着代理数量的增长，这些方法变得效率低下，并且也可能产生平衡，从而产生各个药物结果的显着差异。取而代之的是，我们考虑相关的平衡，玩家可以通过公共信号进行协调，并引入了社会公平的替代最佳标准，可以将其应用于NASH和相关的平衡。我们表明，相关平衡更容易计算，更公平，也可以改善关节结果。我们为普通表单游戏和具有时间逻辑规范的多玩家并发随机游戏的更复杂案例实现算法。
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application of game-theoretic methods is more recent. Tools such as PRISM-games support automated verification and synthesis of zero-sum and (epsilon-optimal subgame-perfect) social welfare Nash equilibria properties for concurrent stochastic games. However, these methods become inefficient as the number of agents grows and may also generate equilibria that yield significant variations in the outcomes for individual agents. Instead, we consider correlated equilibria, in which players can coordinate through public signals, and introduce an alternative optimality criterion of social fairness, which can be applied to both Nash and correlated equilibria. We show that correlated equilibria are easier to compute, are more equitable, and can also improve joint outcomes. We implement algorithms for both normal form games and the more complex case of multi-player concurrent stochastic games with temporal logic specifications.
