论文标题
作为保险的声誉：在公司决定获利后，声誉如何缓和公众反弹
Reputation as insurance: how reputation moderates public backlash following a company's decision to profiteer
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究公司的公司声誉是否从企业社会责任的活动中获得，并且公司领导的声誉与他或她的业务敏锐度无关，可能会影响经济行动公平的评估。我们提供了实验证据，表明良好的公司声誉有因果关系缓解个人决定从需求增加中获利后的负面公平判断。糟糕的公司声誉并不能决定将其作为不太可接受的决定。但是，有证据表明，个人判断为不公平的公司决定提高产品价格以防止损失的决定。因此，我们的结果凸显了良好声誉在保护公司免受严重负面判断免于做出经济决定不公平的经济决定的重要性。
We examine whether a company's corporate reputation gained from their CSR activities and a company leader's reputation, one that is unrelated to his or her business acumen, can impact economic action fairness appraisals. We provide experimental evidence that good corporate reputation causally buffers individuals' negative fairness judgment following the firm's decision to profiteer from an increase in the demand. Bad corporate reputation does not make the decision to profiteer as any less acceptable. However, there is evidence that individuals judge as more unfair an ill-reputed firm's decision to raise their product's price to protect against losses. Thus, our results highlight the importance of a good reputation in protecting a firm against severe negative judgments from making an economic decision that the public deems unfair.
