论文标题
部分可观测时空混沌系统的无模型预测
Commitment games with conditional information disclosure
论文作者
论文摘要
在承诺游戏和计划均衡的工作中，已经研究了相互透明的计算机代理的有条件承诺能力。这些文献表明，这些能力如何帮助解决囚犯在完整信息环境中的困境和其他合作失败。但是，尽管这些问题普遍存在，并且可能通过更大的相互透明度来解决，但迄今为止，由于私人信息而引起的效率低下。在这项工作中，我们为承诺游戏介绍了一种新型有条件承诺设备的框架，代理商可以用来有条件地披露私人信息。我们证明了这种环境的民间定理，为事后效率提供了足够的条件，因此代表了没有第三方调解员的代理商之间理想合作的模型。将我们的框架与有关战略信息启示的文献联系起来，我们探讨了有条件披露可用于实现完全合作而无条件披露的情况。最后，扩展了有关程序均衡的先前工作，我们开发了有条件信息披露的实施。我们表明，此实施表格$ε$ -Bayesian Nash Equilibria对应于这些承诺游戏的贝叶斯Nash平衡。
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private information have been neglected thus far in this literature, despite the fact that these problems are pervasive and might also be addressed by greater mutual transparency. In this work, we introduce a framework for commitment games with a new kind of conditional commitment device, which agents can use to conditionally disclose private information. We prove a folk theorem for this setting that provides sufficient conditions for ex post efficiency, and thus represents a model of ideal cooperation between agents without a third-party mediator. Connecting our framework with the literature on strategic information revelation, we explore cases where conditional disclosure can be used to achieve full cooperation while unconditional disclosure cannot. Finally, extending previous work on program equilibrium, we develop an implementation of conditional information disclosure. We show that this implementation forms program $ε$-Bayesian Nash equilibria corresponding to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of these commitment games.
