论文标题
确保无信号的交叉点防止战略干扰攻击：一种宏观方法
Securing Signal-free Intersections against Strategic Jamming Attacks: A Macroscopic Approach
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑面对战略性干扰攻击的连接和自动驾驶汽车的无信号交叉点的安全性。我们使用流体模型来表征宏观交通流穿过交叉路口的交通流量，其中饱和速率源自车辆配位算法。我们对攻击进行了建模，因为在车辆到基础结构连接性上引起的通信潜伏期的突然增加；这种延迟触发了车辆配位的安全模式，从而降低了交叉点饱和速率。战略攻击者选择攻击率，而系统操作员选择关键设计参数，即饱和率或恢复速率。两位球员的行动都诱导了技术成本，并共同确定平均行程延迟。通过分析安全游戏的均衡，我们研究了交叉路口标称排放能力或恢复能力的优选投资水平。
We consider the security-by-design of a signal-free intersection for connected and autonomous vehicles in the face of strategic jamming attacks. We use a fluid model to characterize macroscopic traffic flow through the intersection, where the saturation rate is derived from a vehicle coordination algorithm. We model jamming attacks as sudden increase in communication latency induced on vehicle-to-infrastructure connectivity; such latency triggers the safety mode for vehicle coordination and thus reduces the intersection saturation rate. A strategic attacker selects the attacking rate, while a system operator selects key design parameters, either the saturation rate or the recovery rate. Both players' actions induce technological costs and jointly determine the mean travel delay. By analyzing the equilibrium of the security game, we study the preferable level of investment in the intersection's nominal discharging capability or recovery capability.
