论文标题
光生:使用模块化来扩展BGP控制平面验证
LIGHTYEAR: Using Modularity to Scale BGP Control Plane Verification
论文作者
论文摘要
当前的网络控制平面验证工具无法扩展到大型网络,因为关于网络中所有节点行为的共同推理的复杂性。在本文中,我们提出了一种模块化方法来控制平面验证,从而通过一组单个节点和边缘对纯本地检查进行了端到端的网络属性。该方法针对BGP配置的安全属性验证,并在面对邻居的任意外部路线公告和任意节点/链接失败的情况下提供保证。我们已经证明了正确的方法,并在称为Lightyear的工具中实现了该方法。实验结果表明,光生尺度比先前的对照平面验证者更好。此外,我们已经使用Lightyear来验证主要云提供商的大面积网络的三个属性,其中包含数百个路由器和数万个边缘。据我们所知,尚无以前的工具在该规模上提供此类保证。最后,除了缩放优势外,我们的模块化验证方法可以轻松地定位配置错误的原因并在更新配置时支持增量重新验证。
Current network control plane verification tools cannot scale to large networks, because of the complexity of jointly reasoning about the behaviors of all nodes in the network. In this paper we present a modular approach to control plane verification, whereby end-to-end network properties are verified via a set of purely local checks on individual nodes and edges. The approach targets the verification of safety properties for BGP configurations and provides guarantees in the face of both arbitrary external route announcements from neighbors and arbitrary node/link failures. We have proven the approach correct and also implemented it in a tool called Lightyear. Experimental results show that Lightyear scales dramatically better than prior control plane verifiers. Further, we have used Lightyear to verify three properties of the wide area network of a major cloud provider, containing hundreds of routers and tens of thousands of edges. To our knowledge no prior tool has been demonstrated to provide such guarantees at that scale. Finally, in addition to the scaling benefits, our modular approach to verification makes it easy to localize the causes of configuration errors and to support incremental re-verification as configurations are updated.