论文标题
ATDD：云存储中的细粒度保证时间敏感的数据删除方案
ATDD: Fine-Grained Assured Time-Sensitive Data Deletion Scheme in Cloud Storage
论文作者
论文摘要
随着一般云服务的快速发展，越来越多的个人或集体使用云平台来存储数据。保证数据删除值得在云存储中进行调查。在时间敏感的数据存储方案中，云平台必须在数据所有者指定的到期时间后自动销毁数据。因此，应寻求确保时代敏感的数据删除。在本文中，通过将时间陷阱门嵌入基于Ciphertext-Policy属性的加密（CP-ABE）中，提出了云存储中的细化的保证时间敏感性数据删除（ATDD）方案。在数据所有者指定的到期时间之后，有时敏感的数据会自毁，以便授权用户无法访问相关数据。此外，凭证将返回到数据所有者以进行数据删除验证。该提出的方案提供了用于细粒度访问控制和可验证数据自我毁灭的解决方案。详细的安全性和绩效分析证明了拟议方案的安全性和实用性。
With the rapid development of general cloud services, more and more individuals or collectives use cloud platforms to store data. Assured data deletion deserves investigation in cloud storage. In time-sensitive data storage scenarios, it is necessary for cloud platforms to automatically destroy data after the data owner-specified expiration time. Therefore, assured timesensitive data deletion should be sought. In this paper, a finegrained assured time-sensitive data deletion (ATDD) scheme in cloud storage is proposed by embedding the time trapdoor in Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Timesensitive data is self-destructed after the data owner-specified expiration time so that the authorized users cannot get access to the related data. In addition, a credential is returned to the data owner for data deletion verification. This proposed scheme provides solutions for fine-grained access control and verifiable data self-destruction. Detailed security and performance analysis demonstrate the security and the practicability of the proposed scheme.
