论文标题
连续可变量子密钥分布：具有可信赖的硬件噪声针对一般攻击的安全分析
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution: security analysis with trusted hardware noise against general attacks
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，使用完整的安全框架用于连续变量量子密钥分布（CV-QKD），我们在现实实现中为CV-QKD系统提供了可组合的安全性证明。我们考虑了设备损失和来自多余噪声的各个组成部分的贡献，并根据可信赖的硬件噪声来评估集体和连贯攻击的性能。该计算表明，在存在集体攻击的情况下，该系统仍可以在通道损失高达10.2 dB的通道损失下可行，并且在存在相干攻击的情况下最多可操作。
In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation. We take into account equipment losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware noise. The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in the presence of coherent ones.
