论文标题
婚姻问题中偏好启示游戏的渐近稳定匹配和进化动态
Asymptotically stable matchings and evolutionary dynamics of preference revelation games in marriage problems
论文作者
论文摘要
关于集中匹配市场的文献通常假设每个玩家的真正偏好是她自己和固定的，但是经验证据表现出对其合理性的怀疑。为了解决这个问题，我们考虑了婚姻问题中偏爱启示游戏的进化动态。我们制定了匹配的渐近稳定性，表明对玩家的偏好报告策略的足够小变化具有动态鲁棒性，并表明在存在时渐近稳定的匹配是稳定的。提出了复制器动力学的仿真结果，以证明渐近稳定性。我们为市场设计师提供了一个实用的见解，即可以通过引入一个学习期来实现稳定的匹配，其中参与者通过试用和错误找到适当的报告策略。我们还通过演示在集中式市场研究中使用进化游戏理论的方法来打开新的研究领域。
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary dynamics of preference revelation games in marriage problems. We formulate the asymptotic stability of a matching, indicating the dynamical robustness against sufficiently small changes in players' preference reporting strategies, and show that asymptotically stable matchings are stable when they exist. The simulation results of replicator dynamics are presented to demonstrate the asymptotic stability. We contribute a practical insight for market designers that a stable matching may be realized by introducing a learning period in which participants find appropriate reporting strategies through trial and error. We also open doors to a novel area of research by demonstrating ways to employ evolutionary game theory in studies on centralized markets.
