论文标题
您还能看到我吗？：通过端到端加密频道重建机器人操作
Can You Still See Me?: Reconstructing Robot Operations Over End-to-End Encrypted Channels
论文作者
论文摘要
互联机器人在行业4.0中起着关键作用，为许多工业工作流提供了自动化和更高的效率。不幸的是，这些机器人可以将有关这些操作工作流程的敏感信息泄漏到远程对手。尽管存在在此类设置中使用端到端加密进行数据传输的任务，但被动对手完全有可能进行指纹和重建整个工作流程 - 建立对设施运作方式的理解。在本文中，我们研究了远程攻击者是否可以准确地指纹机器人运动并最终重建操作工作流程。使用神经网络方法进行交通分析，我们发现可以预测精度约为60％的TLS加密运动，在现实的网络条件下提高到近乎完美的精度。此外，我们还发现攻击者可以以类似的成功重建仓库工作流。最终，简单地采用最佳网络安全实践显然不足以阻止（被动）对手。
Connected robots play a key role in Industry 4.0, providing automation and higher efficiency for many industrial workflows. Unfortunately, these robots can leak sensitive information regarding these operational workflows to remote adversaries. While there exists mandates for the use of end-to-end encryption for data transmission in such settings, it is entirely possible for passive adversaries to fingerprint and reconstruct entire workflows being carried out -- establishing an understanding of how facilities operate. In this paper, we investigate whether a remote attacker can accurately fingerprint robot movements and ultimately reconstruct operational workflows. Using a neural network approach to traffic analysis, we find that one can predict TLS-encrypted movements with around ~60% accuracy, increasing to near-perfect accuracy under realistic network conditions. Further, we also find that attackers can reconstruct warehousing workflows with similar success. Ultimately, simply adopting best cybersecurity practices is clearly not enough to stop even weak (passive) adversaries.
