论文标题
通过随机检查与激励兼容的公共交通票价
Incentive-compatible public transportation fares with random inspection
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了设计公共交通价格的问题，在这种问题中，通过随机检查乘客的门票而不是物理上阻止其访问权限来进行付款。乘客是完全战略性的，因此他们可以在优化决策中选择不同的路线或购买部分门票。我们为每位乘客选择购买全票的价格提供表达方式。使用来自华盛顿特区地铁的旅行和定价数据，我们表明，转向票务的随机检查方法，同时保持当前价格可能会导致由于避免票价而导致的收入损失的59％以上，同时调整价格以将激励措施降低到不到20％，而不会增加价格。
We consider the problem of designing prices for public transport where payment enforcing is done through random inspection of passengers' tickets as opposed to physically blocking their access. Passengers are fully strategic such that they may choose different routes or buy partial tickets in their optimizing decision. We derive expressions for the prices that make every passenger choose to buy the full ticket. Using travel and pricing data from the Washington DC metro, we show that a switch to a random inspection method for ticketing while keeping current prices could lead to more than 59% of revenue loss due to fare evasion, while adjusting prices to take incentives into consideration would reduce that loss to less than 20%, without any increase in prices.
