论文标题
易于改进的证据的悖论性质
The paradoxical nature of easily improvable evidence
论文作者
论文摘要
建立的框架了解科学中可重复性的问题始于我们对索赔先前概率的理解与应要求其要求的统计确定性之间的关系，并探讨独立研究，研究设计和出版偏见的偏见与这些考虑相互作用的方式。 我们提出了一种互补的观点。也就是说，要提高科学的可重复性，我们对证据的说服力的解释（例如，统计意义阈值）应该对我们对改善证据所需的努力的理解有何反应。我们将在某些正式环境中量化这一概念。的确，我们将证明，即使是简单的证据出版模型也可以表现出可改进的证据悖论，在该悖论中，易于改进的证据以索赔最好的证据可以将其视为证据是错误的。
Established frameworks to understand problems with reproducibility in science begin with the relationship between our understanding of the prior probability of a claim and the statistical certainty that should be demanded of it, and explore the ways in which independent investigations, biases in study design and publication bias interact with these considerations. We propose a complementary perspective; namely, that to improve reproducibility in science, our interpretation of the persuasiveness of evidence (e.g., statistical significance thresholds) should be responsive to our understanding of the effort that would be required to improve that evidence. We will quantify this notion in some formal settings. Indeed, we will demonstrate that even simplistic models of evidence publication can exhibit an improvable evidence paradox, where the publication of easily improvable evidence in favor of a claim can best seen as evidence the claim is false.
