论文标题

带有耦合约束的需求端管理的恢复地平线游戏

Receding Horizon Games with Coupling Constraints for Demand-Side Management

论文作者

Hall, Sophie, Belgioioso, Giuseppe, Liao-McPherson, Dominic, Dörfler, Florian

论文摘要

分布式的能量存储和柔性负载是确保电网稳定且可靠的操作的重要工具,尽管由于挥发性可再生能源产生的整合以及由于广泛的电气化而引起的峰值负载所带来的挑战。本文提出了一项需求侧管理政策,以基于回收的地平线游戏来协调自我利益的能源生产商,即,游戏理论日间计划的闭环回收者实施。在对称定价假设中使用游戏理论和经济模型预测性控制的工具证明了对拟议反馈控制政策的实际稳定性和递归约束满意度。我们的数值研究表明,就剃须,干扰拒绝和控制性能而言,所提出的方法优于标准的开环日头实现。

Distributed energy storage and flexible loads are essential tools for ensuring stable and robust operation of the power grid in spite of the challenges arising from the integration of volatile renewable energy generation and increasing peak loads due to widespread electrification. This paper proposes a demand-side management policy to coordinate self-interested energy prosumers based on receding horizon games, i.e., a closed-loop receding-horizon implementation of game-theoretic day-ahead planning. Practical stability and recursive constraint satisfaction of the proposed feedback control policy is proven under symmetric pricing assumptions using tools from game theory and economic model predictive control. Our numerical studies show that the proposed approach is superior to standard open-loop day-head implementations in terms of peak-shaving, disturbance rejection, and control performance.

扫码加入交流群

加入微信交流群

微信交流群二维码

扫码加入学术交流群,获取更多资源