论文标题
关于记忆对囚犯在相关网络中的困境游戏的影响
On the effect of memory on the Prisoner's Dilemma game in correlated networks
论文作者
论文摘要
游戏理论对于理解代理之间的合作至关重要。主要是，囚犯的困境是一种著名的模型，在复杂的网络中进行了广泛的研究。但是，尽管以前已经研究过合作的出现，但记忆在进化中的影响尚未得到充分理解。本文介绍了对代理具有记忆力的合作动力学的详细研究。我们在随机，无规模和网络上模拟了进化囚犯的困境游戏，以呈现学位相关性。通过广泛的模拟，我们表明，当缺陷的诱惑增加时，分类性可以改善合作。此外，我们表明内存的包含减少了网络结构的影响。我们的结果有助于了解网络结构的作用和玩家的合作记忆。
Game theory is fundamental to understanding cooperation between agents. Mainly, the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known model that has been extensively studied in complex networks. However, although the emergence of cooperation has been investigated before, the influence of memory in its evolution is not well understood. This paper presents a detailed study of cooperation dynamics in which agents have memory. We simulate the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on random, scale-free and networks presenting degree-degree correlation. Through extensive simulations, we show that assortativity can improve cooperation when the temptation to defect increases. Moreover, we show that the inclusion of memory decreases the network structure influence. Our results contribute to understanding the role of the network structure and the player's memory of cooperation.
