论文标题
表征流动民主的集中代表团机制的财产和权衡
Characterizing Properties and Trade-offs of Centralized Delegation Mechanisms in Liquid Democracy
论文作者
论文摘要
液体民主是一种及时的代授权民主形式，近年来吸引了计算机科学界的一系列学术关注。以最简单的形式，每个代理商都以一票开始，并可能通过其他代理商的委派分配给他们的其他投票。他们可以选择将分配给他们的所有投票委托给另一个代理商，或直接以分配给他们的所有选票投票。但是，许多提出对流动民主的认识允许代理商以更复杂的方式表达其代表团/投票偏好（例如，潜在代表的排名清单），并采用集中的委派机制来计算最终的投票统计。这样一来，集中的代表团机制可以做出影响投票结果以及代理人是否能够委派其投票的决定。迄今为止，许多分析都集中在这些机制做出正确选择的能力上。我们通过在诸如问责制，透明度，解释性，公平性和用户代理等关键特征方面引入和形式化集中式授权机制的其他重要特性，扩展了这一分析。此外，我们根据这些属性评估现有方法，展示如何增加一些先前的工作以实现理想的属性，证明同时实现某些属性的不可能结果，并突出显示未来工作的方向。
Liquid democracy is a form of transitive delegative democracy that has received a flurry of scholarly attention from the computer science community in recent years. In its simplest form, every agent starts with one vote and may have other votes assigned to them via delegation from other agents. They can choose to delegate all votes assigned to them to another agent or vote directly with all votes assigned to them. However, many proposed realizations of liquid democracy allow for agents to express their delegation/voting preferences in more complex ways (e.g., a ranked list of potential delegates) and employ a centralized delegation mechanism to compute the final vote tally. In doing so, centralized delegation mechanisms can make decisions that affect the outcome of a vote and where/whether agents are able to delegate their votes. Much of the analysis thus far has focused on the ability of these mechanisms to make a correct choice. We extend this analysis by introducing and formalizing other important properties of a centralized delegation mechanism in liquid democracy with respect to crucial features such as accountability, transparency, explainability, fairness, and user agency. In addition, we evaluate existing methods in terms of these properties, show how some prior work can be augmented to achieve desirable properties, prove impossibility results for achieving certain sets of properties simultaneously, and highlight directions for future work.
