论文标题
不要抬头：商业空间中无处不在的数据剥落途径
Don't Look Up: Ubiquitous Data Exfiltration Pathways in Commercial Spaces
论文作者
论文摘要
我们表明，作为建筑法规要求的副作用，如今几乎所有商业建筑都容易受到新的数据渗透攻击的影响，即使它们是空地的，并且抵抗了传统攻击。新攻击使用不起眼的发射器振动，将建筑物的物理基础结构之间的数据发送到接收器。我们对几个大型现实世界建筑物的分析和实验表明，单频比特率为300kbps，足以传输普通文件，实时MP3质量音频或定期高质量的静止照片。攻击者可以使用多个通道传输，例如实时MP4质量视频。我们讨论了检测攻击和各种潜在对策的可行性的困难。
We show that as a side effect of building code requirements, almost all commercial buildings today are vulnerable to a novel data exfiltration attack, even if they are air-gapped and secured against traditional attacks. The new attack uses vibrations from an inconspicuous transmitter to send data across the building's physical infrastructure to a receiver. Our analysis and experiments with several large real-world buildings show a single-frequency bit rate of 300Kbps, which is sufficient to transmit ordinary files, real-time MP3-quality audio, or periodic high-quality still photos. The attacker can use multiple channels to transmit, for example, real-time MP4-quality video. We discuss the difficulty of detecting the attack and the viability of various potential countermeasures.
