论文标题
具有认证删除的密码学
Cryptography with Certified Deletion
论文作者
论文摘要
我们提出了一个新的，统一的框架，该框架产生了一系列具有认证删除的加密原始框架。这些原语使一方能够拥有量子密文，以生成经典的证书，该证书已被理论上删除了信息，即使没有限制的计算资源，也无法恢复。 - 对于X \ in {public-key，基于属性的，完全塑形的，证人，定时释放}，我们的编译器将任何（Quantum）X加密转换为具有认证删除的X加密。此外，我们还通过经过认证的Everlasting Hiding编制了统计结合的承诺。作为推论，我们还获得了QMA的统计零知识证明，并具有经认证的零知识认证，假设统计结合承诺。 - 在不诚实的多数环境中，我们还获得了两方和多方计算的强烈形式。尽管已知在这种情况下同时实现针对各方的永恒安全性是不可能的，但我们引入了永恒的安全转移（EST）。这使任何一方（或当事方的子集）能够在协议执行后动态和认证的信息在理论上删除其他参与者的数据。我们使用EST构建通用的安全计算，假设统计结合的承诺可以基于单向函数或伪随机量子状态。 我们通过开发一种新颖的证明技术来获得我们的结果，以争辩说，一旦他们输出有效的删除证书，就从对手的角度删除了一点点B，尽管以前是由他们在视图中持有的密文来确定的，尽管他们以前的信息确定了。该技术可能具有独立的兴趣。
We propose a new, unifying framework that yields an array of cryptographic primitives with certified deletion. These primitives enable a party in possession of a quantum ciphertext to generate a classical certificate that the encrypted plaintext has been information-theoretically deleted, and cannot be recovered even given unbounded computational resources. - For X \in {public-key, attribute-based, fully-homomorphic, witness, timed-release}, our compiler converts any (post-quantum) X encryption to X encryption with certified deletion. In addition, we compile statistically-binding commitments to statistically-binding commitments with certified everlasting hiding. As a corollary, we also obtain statistically-sound zero-knowledge proofs for QMA with certified everlasting zero-knowledge assuming statistically-binding commitments. - We also obtain a strong form of everlasting security for two-party and multi-party computation in the dishonest majority setting. While simultaneously achieving everlasting security against all parties in this setting is known to be impossible, we introduce everlasting security transfer (EST). This enables any one party (or a subset of parties) to dynamically and certifiably information-theoretically delete other participants' data after protocol execution. We construct general-purpose secure computation with EST assuming statistically-binding commitments, which can be based on one-way functions or pseudorandom quantum states. We obtain our results by developing a novel proof technique to argue that a bit b has been information-theoretically deleted from an adversary's view once they output a valid deletion certificate, despite having been previously information-theoretically determined by the ciphertext they held in their view. This technique may be of independent interest.
