论文标题

对人类行为的模型在道德上是令人怀疑的,并且在数学上是不一致的

Homo economicus to model human behavior is ethically doubtful and mathematically inconsistent

论文作者

Lunkenheimer, M., Kracklauer, A., Klinkova, G., Grabinski, M.

论文摘要

在经济学或业务的许多模型中,假定了一个主要的自我利益经济性。不幸的是(或幸运的是),人类通常不是Homines Economici,例如最后通的游戏显示。这导致了这样一个事实,即所有这些模型至少令人怀疑。此外,经济学家开始为社会正义,利他主义或嫉妒等人的感觉设定定量价值,以执行功利主义计算。除了在道德上令人怀疑之外,它还在事后看来提供了一个解释,几乎没有预测的力量。我们使用游戏理论的示例来显示其任意性。由于人类价值观的差异,甚至根本不存在,甚至根本不存在稳定的NASH平衡,甚至有可能计算稳定的NASH平衡。最后,我们证明了分配的嫉妒或利他主义的数字,等等(从数学意义上讲)都不建立一个领域。由于对实数或该子集没有同态,因此任何计算通常都是无效或任意的。没有(简单)解决问题的方法。必须回到诸如分类命令之类的道德概念或在大多数半定量方法中使用,例如考虑刀具和骑士。从数学上讲,人们只能推测是否例如超现实数字可以使道德规范可计算。

In many models in economics or business a dominantly self-interested homo economicus is assumed. Unfortunately (or fortunately), humans are in general not homines economici as e.g. the ultimatum game shows. This leads to the fact that all these models are at least doubtful. Moreover, economists started to set a quantitative value for the feeling of social justice, altruism, or envy and the like to execute utilitarian calculation. Besides being ethically doubtful, it delivers an explanation in hindsight with little predicting power. We use examples from game theory to show its arbitrariness. It is even possible that a stable Nash equilibrium can be calculated while it does not exist at all, due to the wide differences in human values. Finally, we show that assigned numbers for envy or altruism and the like do not build a field (in a mathematical sense). As there is no homomorphism to real numbers or a subset of it, any calculation is generally invalid or arbitrary. There is no (easy) way to fix the problem. One has to go back to ethical concepts like the categorical imperative or use at most semi quantitative approaches like considering knaves and knights. Mathematically one can only speculate whether e.g. surreal numbers can make ethics calculable.

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