论文标题
遗憾的无真相投票规则
Regret-free truth-telling voting rules
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究不同类别的投票规则的能力，即使特工想避免后悔，我们可以真实地报告他们的偏好。首先，我们表明，遗憾的真相销售等同于仅限最高规则中的策略范围。然后，我们将重点放在三个重要的家庭（仅限）投票方法上：Maxmin，评分和Condorcet一致的族。我们证明了Maxmin和评分规则的中性和匿名版本的正面和负面结果。在某些情况下，我们提供了必要和充分的条件。我们还表明，满足轻度单调性要求的condorcet一致的规则并不后悔没有遗憾的真相。尽管不满足单调性条件，但连续的淘汰规则仍未遗憾地说明。最后，我们为三种替代方案和两个代理提供了两个特征。
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among tops-only rules. Then, we focus on three important families of (non-tops-only) voting methods: maxmin, scoring, and Condorcet consistent ones. We prove positive and negative results for both neutral and anonymous versions of maxmin and scoring rules. In several instances we provide necessary and sufficient conditions. We also show that Condorcet consistent rules that satisfy a mild monotonicity requirement are not regret-free truth-telling. Successive elimination rules fail to be regret-free truth-telling despite not satisfying the monotonicity condition. Lastly, we provide two characterizations for the case of three alternatives and two agents.
