论文标题
一个重复的未知游戏:车辆雾计算中的分散任务卸载
A repeated unknown game: Decentralized task offloading in vehicular fog computing
论文作者
论文摘要
将计算卸载到附近的边缘/雾计算节点,包括移动车辆所携带的计算节点,例如车辆雾气节点(VFN),已被证明是一种有希望的方法,可用于实现低延迟和计算密集型的移动性应用,例如合作和自动驾驶。这项工作考虑了车辆雾计算方案,其中计算卸载服务的客户试图在决定哪些VFN卸载任务时尽量减少其成本。我们专注于在一个重复的未知游戏中分散的多代理决策,例如每个代理商(例如,服务客户端)只能观察自己的行动并实现成本。换句话说,每个代理都不知道游戏组成,甚至没有对手的存在。我们应用了一个完全未耦合的学习规则来概括\ cite {cho2021}中给出的分散决策算法。这项工作中提出的多机构解决方案可以捕获未知的卸载成本变化在对抗性框架下降低了对资源充血的降低成本变化,在该框架下,每个代理商可能会采取隐式成本估算,并适当的资源选择适应与挥发性供应和需求相关的动态。根据通过模拟的评估,这项工作表明,这种个人对不确定性和适应动态的稳健性的扰动可确保在社会福利方面确保一定程度的最佳性,例如,由于自我创造的iNperesnesternesterestecienorsementerestemers of Agenters of Agnesters of Agnestemers of Agnestemers of Agnestemers of Agensemers of Agansemers of Agnersperimens of ageSent of''的实际游戏的实际游戏顺序。
Offloading computation to nearby edge/fog computing nodes, including the ones carried by moving vehicles, e.g., vehicular fog nodes (VFN), has proved to be a promising approach for enabling low-latency and compute-intensive mobility applications, such as cooperative and autonomous driving. This work considers vehicular fog computing scenarios where the clients of computation offloading services try to minimize their own costs while deciding which VFNs to offload their tasks. We focus on decentralized multi-agent decision-making in a repeated unknown game where each agent, e.g., service client, can observe only its own action and realized cost. In other words, each agent is unaware of the game composition or even the existence of opponents. We apply a completely uncoupled learning rule to generalize the decentralized decision-making algorithm presented in \cite{Cho2021} for the multi-agent case. The multi-agent solution proposed in this work can capture the unknown offloading cost variations susceptive to resource congestion under an adversarial framework where each agent may take implicit cost estimation and suitable resource choice adapting to the dynamics associated with volatile supply and demand. According to the evaluation via simulation, this work reveals that such individual perturbations for robustness to uncertainty and adaptation to dynamicity ensure a certain level of optimality in terms of social welfare, e.g., converging the actual sequence of play with unknown and asymmetric attributes and lowering the correspondent cost in social welfare due to the self-interested behaviors of agents.